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The truth is, however, that this work is the result of the enthusiastic following out of the consequences of a single fundamental principle. The weakest point is probably the hypothesis of a primitive atheistical religion. In all the religions of which we are credibly informed, it is beings of a more or less personal character that are worshipped; and, indeed, the attitude of worship is one that distinctly implies a person's susceptibility to praise and supplication. Fidelity to a theory has blinded our author to much that a less able man would not have overlooked. Despite this, perhaps because of this, he has produced a most illuminating work of which every investigator in this field for a generation must take account.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND REALITY: AN ESSAY TOUCHING THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS. By EDWARD DOUGLAS FAWCETT. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909.

The construction of a system of metaphysics is like the child's play with his building-blocks. You start from a foundation of solid truism—the immediate testimony of consciousness, you call it—and upon this set safe and steady probabilities and then more and more shaky possibilities, balancing the crazy structure carefully as it rises higher and higher; and when at last it comes crashing down, you gather up the blocks and, undaunted, build them to a dizzier eminence than ever. From the obvious to the ridiculous that is the game.

This is what Mr. Fawcett has been doing, and hugely he has enjoyed the sport. And now that he has succeeded in rearing a particularly tall and shaky tower, he is eager to have us come and look at it before some little accident topples it over.

The book is divided into three parts. The first two deal with the more technical questions of metaphysical theory (the method, the nature of truth, the relation of mind and body, freedom and determinism), but in a breezy style that happily circumvents their difficulties. In the third part "Ultimate Questions" are considered, such as the nature of reality, the existence of gods and their relation to the cosmos, immortality. The main argument runs somewhat as follows:

Metaphysics is the study of the general nature of appearances, the attempt to grasp the universe as a whole. Whereas a science concerns itself only with some special order or aspect of appearances and so reaches results which, although satisfactory for the special ends in view, are hopelessly one-sided; metaphysics seeks principles that shall apply to all orders of reality. We must, however, recognize from the outset that all theoretical truth is abstract, and hence is essentially inadequate to portray the concrete richness of reality. A mystic vision could alone yield a perfectly satisfactory insight into things, and this we do not, at the present stage of our development, possess. Theoretical truth, such as it is, we may attain; for all appearances are real and there is no unknowable. Sound metaphysics must start from appearances as experienced and proceed on the assumption that whatever exists must be at least capable of appearing in experience—that is to say, must not be essentially different from experienced reality.

I cannot soberly think that I alone exist. Other sentient beings have an existence of their own quite apart from their occasional presence to my perception; and if they, then a whole universe as well. Each conscious centre of experience contains two aspects—the so-called subject and object

or me and not me. These must not be taken to be distinct realities. The object is simply what is for the moment attended to; and the subject is the vaguer background, shading off into the subconscious. Now just as within a human centre one can discern various degrees of intensity of experience so different kinds of centres (human, animal, vegetable or even atomic) are distinguished from each other by their degree of psychic activity. For all activity, even the so-called physical, is essentially psychic—that is to say, at least potentially conscious. What is not actually conscious is subconscious rather than unconscious.

All reality is in a constant flux; and the centres are like eddies carried along in a stream, each containing smaller eddies and itself contained within the circumference of larger eddies. The ground of them all is the primitive subconscious *mother-stuff*, which is at once their source and support, which divides and yet relates them. The hypothesis of a creator is accordingly untenable. There may be and probably are gods in the sense of higher centres than ours who may exert some influence upon the centres beneath them, although such influence is difficult to detect. The wide-spread dogma of the rebirth of the individual is likewise to be regarded as possessing much probability. Death is only a temporary lessening of activity and consequent sinking into subconsciousness. A new individual, more or less like the old and more or less continuous with it, tends inevitably to reappear. For the former existence has established in reality itself a permanent habit or bent toward his rerudescence.

Such, in the barest outline, is the system. It will be seen that it reaches some dizzy heights. In conclusion, it may be said that, while the author lacks somewhat in appreciation, he gives evidence of a critical acquaintance with a wide field of philosophical literature; and that while his treatment of the issues of current controversy is generally superficial, he knows what is going on in the world of thought. The book is amusing, exasperating and at times undeniably clever and suggestive.

DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION. By THEODORE DE LAGUNA and GRACE A. DE LAGUNA. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910.

Pragmatism, or instrumentalism, has not, perhaps, been subjected to a scrutiny at once more sympathetic and more searching than in the recent volume entitled "Dogmatism and Evolution," by Theodore de Laguna and Grace A. de Laguna. A certain interest attaches to the book both as a contribution to the criticism of pragmatism and to its positive development; for the critics are in entire sympathy with the application of evolutionary methods to logical research and profess, moreover, to be instrumentalists of a more radical type than the very advocates of pragmatism.

An explanation of the title is an explanation of the central theme of the book. By dogmatism, in opposition to evolution, is meant those assumptions common to non-evolutionary logic which consist in positing the existence of simple irreducible elements and the possibility of ultimate analysis.

The treatment of evolutionary logic is introduced by a careful and detailed historical study of the dogmatic systems of logic which evolutionary logic aims to supplant. A subtle examination of the great dogmatic systems of empiricism and rationalism, and of the critical philosophy as a conflict between dogmatism and the new tendencies, a brilliant chapter on the